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Technology transfer and commercialization
A B S T R A C T
Despite many years of substantial government research funding, advanced bio-energy technologies in China
have seen limited commercial application. Chinese policy makers are increasingly critical of academic organi-
zations for neglecting their role in the transfer of scientiﬁc results into industrial applications. We interviewed a
selection of Chinese research groups working on bio-energy technologies, and asked them to describe their
eﬀorts at commercialization. We found that they focus their research on technological pathways with com-
mercial potential, they patent and attempt to license their technologies, they are highly involved in large scale
demonstration plants, and have created a number of new ﬁrms. Industry and government may have unrealistic
expectations on the maturity and scale of technologies that academia can develop, however. These ﬁndings
contrast with many earlier analyses of early commercialization stages of novel technologies, which have com-
monly identiﬁed lacking academic entrepreneurship as a root cause in stalling development.
1. Introduction
Decades of rapid economic development have increased Chinese
carbon dioxide to the point where these are now the world’s largest [1].
Power generation, heavy industry and transport also contribute to se-
vere levels of local air pollution in China’s urban centres [2]. Con-
currently, the industries that have previously buoyed economic devel-
opment (export oriented, labour intensive manufacturing and heavy
industries) are losing traction as a successful and desirable mode of
economic growth.
Chinese policy makers are pushing for two interrelated transfor-
mations to deal with these issues. First, China has ambitious plans for
renewable energy, aiming for 15 per cent by 2020 [3]. Second, policy
makers are pushing for economic restructuring, moving away from
energy and resource intensive industries, and towards innovation
driven growth [4]. Particular attention is given to seven ‘strategic
emerging industries’, which include environmental protection, clean
transportation, and renewable energy [5]. The R & I policy targets
include, amongst others, (1) a substantial increase in R &D intensity
(from 1,75% of GDP in 2010 to 2,5% by 2020), (2) improving in-
digenous innovative strength, and the absorptive capacity for foreign
technology, and (3) improved levels of technology transfer, i.e., the
application of scientiﬁc results from universities and research institutes
in commercial, industrial applications, in particular in high-tech in-
dustries [4].
The ﬁrst two goals should help in creating ‘world-class research
institutions’ [6], whilst the latter goal targets what has been called the
universities’ ‘third mission’ [7]. This third mission ‘encompasses all
activities related to the generation, transfer, use, and exploitation of
knowledge and other capabilities developed inside universities where
the ultimate application is in non-academic environments’ [8; p208],
whereas the ﬁrst and second missions refer to educational and research
tasks [8,9].
With regard to renewable energy sectors, there have been an in-
creasing number of reports that have highlighted Chinese accomplish-
ments in recent years. Despite marginal developments until circa 2005,
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Chinese investments and installations of renewable power have been
the largest globally in recent years [10,11]. Furthermore, Chinese ﬁrms
are increasingly dominant in equipment manufacturing [12,13], as well
as in RD &D output for renewable energies [14,15]. Chinese achieve-
ments, however, are particularly apparent in wind and PV sectors
[10,11,14,15]. China’s bio-energy sector has remained behind in de-
velopment, compared with global averages, compared with successes in
its wind and PV sectors, and even compared with the relatively modest
Chinese development targets for bio-energy [16–19]. This is in spite of
an abundance of biomass resources, and substantial research eﬀorts
into a wide variety of bio-energy pathways [20–25].
As has been the case in other countries [26], Chinese policy makers
have voiced criticism on the ‘return on investment’ generated from
science spending, in particular in terms of commercialization results
[27,28]. The issue has been a focal point in recent discussions on reform
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, China’s biggest science organiza-
tion [28]. This raises the question whether or not the stalling devel-
opment of China’s bio-energy sector is due to lacking academic en-
trepreneurship, i.e., whether or not academics are doing too little to
have their R & D products developed into industrial applications.
This paper presents a case-study of academic entrepreneurship in
China’s emergent innovation system for modern bio-energy technolo-
gies. Academia are understood to personnel at universities as well as
research institutes throughout this paper. We analyse (1) what eﬀorts
Chinese academia pursue in commercializing the products of their
R & D on bio-energy technologies; (2) whether or not this has been a key
barrier in the development of the sector; and (3) what other innovation
system weaknesses are limiting the transfer and development of aca-
demic R &D products into subsequent economic activity.
2. Theory and method
Policy makers across the globe have at occasions voiced criticism at
the, in their eyes, limited societally useful returns from substantial re-
search funding. Some have called for the addition of a ‘third mission’ to
university strategy, for integrated attention to commercial develop-
ment, or otherwise societally useful application of university research.
This ‘third mission’ is in addition to the existing missions of education
and basic research [29]. This policy agenda was inspired by earlier
successful examples of university-industry collaboration at e.g., Stan-
ford and MIT in the 1930s, but expanded throughout Northern Amer-
icas and Europe in the 1980s and 1990s [29]. A number of universities
has reported signiﬁcant revenues from business start-ups and licensing
of patents [30].
In spite of successful examples, however, there is a rather volumi-
nous body of literature that is more critical of academic entrepreneur-
ship and its role in emergent technological ﬁelds. The criticism remains
that academia have a too myopic focus on fundamental research. They
have less regard for development phases beyond scientiﬁc or technical
breakthroughs, nor are their research agendas strongly driven by in-
dustry needs [31].
Some have pointed out that this is in fact partially due to govern-
ment administered research funds, which are usually mandated only to
fund more fundamental forms of research [31,32]. This is out of con-
cern that governments are not particularly good at ‘picking winning
technologies’, and that such choices would create unequal, sub-optimal,
market competition between technological alternatives [33,34]. Fur-
ther, academic rewards, including future career opportunities, are also
skewed towards the more fundamental phases of knowledge develop-
ment [32,35].
There are also institutional or cultural frictions surrounding this
third mission. Studies by Kirby [35] and Williams [36] found that
university management and staﬀ opposed placing an emphasis on en-
trepreneurialism, out of fear it would erode core academic values, “such
as intellectual integrity, critical inquiry and commitment to learning
and understanding” [36; p19]. Courses in entrepreneurship in higher
education curricula have generally been limited to business adminis-
tration programs, prompting organizations including the US’ National
Academy of Sciences and the European Commission to call for their
expansion into technical and scientiﬁc programs [30]. Other analysts
have commented that university faculty not only lack the motivation
and inclination, but also the talent to develop more entrepreneurial
activities [35,37].
As our empirical focus is on emergent innovation systems in China,
we should consider the speciﬁcs of an emerging economy environment
on academia’s third mission. Policy makers in China and other emer-
ging economies in Asia have pushed for a more direct involvement of
universities in industrial innovation. Domestic universities are con-
sidered as critical agents in developing indigenous innovative capacity,
and as a conduit for understanding and utilizing advanced foreign
technology in domestic industries [8,38,39].
So far, there is mixed evidence on the success of this policy push.
Some analysts argue that weak R &D capacity in domestic industry has
meant that Chinese ﬁrms have actively sought collaboration with do-
mestic universities [8,40], whilst others contend that Chinese ﬁrms
consider domestic universities as having weak innovative capacity, and
have therefore chosen to develop in-house R &D eﬀorts [39,41]. Al-
though China has a number of particularly successful examples of
university-aﬃliated enterprises (e.g., Lenovo, Founder), a number of
analysts contend that the development of such ﬁrms has declined since
the mid-2000s [8,39,42]. Lastly, whilst some point to rapidly increased
university based patenting in China as indicative of a greater role in the
commercialization of technologies, others point out that the share of
patents licensed or sold has declined at equally remarkable rates, from
36% of patents granted in 2000 to 8.7% by 2007 [8,43,44].
In the research presented here, we deﬁne academic entrepreneur-
ship by building on the framework of ‘Technological Innovation
Systems’ (TIS). This framework suggests a list of activities required to
develop or sustain a well-functioning innovation system [45,46] (see
Table 1). The framework further stresses that a wide variety of actors is
involved in the process, including universities and research institutes,
(manufacturing) industry, and government agencies, but also ﬁnan-
ciers, consultants, certiﬁcation bodies, maintenance industries, societal
pressure groups, consumers etc. [47–49]. This matters because the ac-
tivities deployed by academics, and the resulting success in furthering
the development of the technological ﬁeld, can never be understood in
isolation. The involvement of other actors, and their activities, can
create an environment that either limits or propels the results from
academic activities into a next phase of technological development. As
such, we investigate the extent to which Chinese academia are in-
volved, unilaterally or in cooperation with industry actors, in activities
listed under ‘entrepreneurial experimentation’ in Table 1. That is;
- Creation of new products, processes and services;
- Patenting and licensing of novel technologies;
- Performing of pilot and (commercial) demonstration activities;
- Establishing new ﬁrms and production facilities.
This is comparable with items considered in earlier deﬁnitions of
academic entrepreneurship, but with more explicit attention to piloting
and demonstration activities [50–52].
2.1. Method and data collection
We performed a case-study of entrepreneurial activities of academia
in China’s bio-energy sector. Data collection occurred through a lit-
erature review, a round of interviews and a series of workshops. The
literature review provided a general overview of the development of
China’s bio-energy sector and innovation policies. The review also
helped identify central actors in academia, industry and policy circles.
A total of 30 specialists were interviewed. Most interviewees were
involved in either fundamental or engineering research, and were
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senior researchers that had been involved in their respective ﬁelds for a
number of decades. Together, they represent a wide range of diﬀerent
feedstocks used, diﬀerent conversion processes, and diﬀerent energy
products (see Appendix A). Interview questions were structured using
the list of activities presented in Table 1, and focused on the main
challenges in the development of the speciﬁc technology that the in-
terviewee was working on, and the activities the interviewee undertook
to address these challenges.
Interviews were conducted in English, but a Chinese translator
made occasional clariﬁcations regarding the content of the questions
and answers. Each interview was recorded and notes were taken. Each
recording was checked against the notes, and the Chinese translator
also made additional clariﬁcations concerning names of places, etc.
In addition, four small seminars were held at Zhejiang University,
China Agricultural University, Guangzhou Institute of Energy
Technology and Tsinghua University. Two further, larger workshops
were organized in Sweden and China, and were attended by re-
presentatives of the National Development and Reform Committee,
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Technology and the National
Energy Administration as well as university and industry re-
presentatives.
3. Results: entrepreneurial activities of Chinese academia in the
ﬁeld of advanced bio-energy technologies
In Sections 3.1 through 3.4, we describe activities at commerciali-
zation of bio-energy technologies by the interviewed research groups.
3.1. Creation of new products, processes and services
When asked about most recent progress and development issues,
many of the researchers’ comments immediately coupled current re-
search activities with later, more applied phases of the technology.
Speciﬁcally, in much of the research on conversion processes, there was
a very explicit focus on improving economic competitiveness, e.g., re-
duction of processing cost or improved conversion eﬃciency.
For example, one of the research groups at the Guangzhou Institute
of Energy Conversion works on cellulosic ethanol production. The
group is well aware of the enzymes available from diﬀerent global and
domestic suppliers, their cost and conversion eﬃciency, and is working
on in-house production of enzymes, with the stated purpose of reducing
ethanol production cost:
“the quality and eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent enzymes is diﬀerent. The
highest quality is from Novozymes, but it is too expensive. So in our
research we use domestic enzymes, and we also do research to produce
our own enzymes. […] If we have our own enzyme we can lower the
[ethanol production] cost.”
Similarly, at a research group at the East China University of Science
and Technology, also working on production processes for cellulosic
bio-ethanol, using dilute-acid hydrolysis. Central to their work is the
improvement of overall processing cost and revenue in a future de-
monstration plant or production facility:
“Enzymatic hydrolysis is expensive because of the enzymes, and maybe
we cannot reduce the cost so much. Because the enzymes are so ex-
pensive, we use acid hydrolysis. The problem of this pre-treatment step is
the higher energy consumption.” […] “we are trying to cover energy
consumption using gasiﬁcation of sawdust, which also yields active
carbon. This may become quite proﬁtable because the proﬁt of active
carbon is about 1000 RMB per ton. […] Because gasiﬁcation, I think,
also requires a large investment, maybe we will just use combustion in a
demonstration plant.”
A number of researchers indicated that even the selection of speciﬁc
technological pathways to focus on in their research groups were sub-
ject to its’ market potential.
For example, at the biomass thermal-chemical conversion labora-
tory at the Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion, they realized that
their biomass gasiﬁcation technologies were increasingly being out-
competed by direct combustion technologies in applications for electric
power production (more on this in Section 3.4):
“Because we cannot get money from power generation, we changed our
research to biomass to liquids. [.] So we use gasiﬁcation and produce
syngas and then use syngas to synthesize some liquid fuels.”
Another example of such reorientation was found in the research
done at the Biomass Synthesis fuels and Chemicals Lab, also at the
Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion. This lab had searched for
uses of their catalytic biomass conversion technologies, and had iden-
tiﬁed bio-jet fuels as having strong potential for proﬁtable applications,
most importantly because revenue per ton of fuel would be higher for
jet fuels than for other transport fuels. The group managed to keep
production cost at reasonable levels, and batches of their fuel met in-
ternational aviation fuel standards, but use of the fuel at commercial
Table 1
Innovation system functions and corresponding actor activities.
Source: combination and elaboration on [45,46,48,53].
System function Requires actors to…
1. Knowledge development • Perform fundamental, proof of principle, prototype R &D activities• Develop instruments, research and engineering design and methods• Perform scientiﬁc publishing
2. Knowledge diﬀusion through networks • Create and participate in cross-disciplinary and cross-sectoral networks• Exchange and combine new knowledge from diﬀerent ﬁelds and backgrounds
3. Inﬂuence on the direction of search • Steer technological development, e.g., user-producer feedback, technological roadmaps or preferential policy and
regulation
• Develop and articulate visions on the future potential of the technology
4. Entrepreneurial experimentation and materialization • Create new products, processes and services• Patent and license novel technologies• Perform pilot and (commercial) demonstration activities• Establish new ﬁrms and production facilities
5. Market formation • Identify, utilize and strengthen niche markets• Articulate demand, e.g., by (governmental) launching customers, with consumption quota or policy targets• Create price premiums, e.g., with eco-branding or with ﬁscal instruments (taxation or tax exemption, subsidies)
6. Resource mobilization • Develop/attract human resources (includes education)• Provide/attract funding, for RD &D and manufacturing facilities• Provide/attract complementary products, services, infrastructure
7. Legitimation • Articulate societal beneﬁts and develop societal acceptance of the novel technology, e.g., by participation in
public debate
• Lobby for/implement preferential policy and regulations
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scale remained diﬃcult because of strict aviation fuel regulations.
Because of this, the group decided to focus their future research and
demonstration activities on the production of bio-gasoline (a hydro-
carbon chemically similar to fossil gasoline, not an alcohol fuel). The
groups’ leader indicated that they were convinced to switch to this
product after receiving much interest from industry, amongst others
because the chemical similarity means the bio-gasoline is a drop-in
replacement and may be mixed at any ratio with fossil based gasoline.
Nearly all of the interviewees indicated that their groups had been
providing services, in the form of consulting assignments for industry or
government agencies.
In one example, a group of researchers at National Key Laboratory
of Biochemical Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, were con-
tracted by a company that had been producing butanol from corn.
Production was halted because of a government moratorium on the use
of grain for the production of fuel or chemicals. The group consulted the
ﬁrm about a number of technological options and assisted in the setup
of a new production line for butanol and paper produced from corn
straw.
Driven by the same government moratorium, a group of researchers
at the Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion were contracted to
help redesign a facility producing ethanol from corn into one that could
produce ethanol from feedstocks such as cassava, sweet sorghum and
cellulosic material.
There are a number of ways in which the research groups were
providing services to government agencies. A small number was re-
cruited as board members in government agencies such as the pro-
vincial development and reform commission or department of science
and technology. It is further common practice in China to have policy
drafts disseminated for comments by experts, and many interviewees
indicated they participated in such commenting rounds. Further, a
number of interviewees had been invited to participate in drafting
regulation. Lastly, an interviewee from the China Agricultural
University indicated he had been recruited to collect data and produce
an overview paper on the developments of cellulosic ethanol research
in universities and research institutes. The assignment does not include
basic research, but rather is aimed at providing policy makers with the
information needed to draft policy for the further development of the
sector.
The results from our interviews, which indicate a relatively high
level of interaction with industry, contrast somewhat with national
level statistics on the topic. Although the total value of contract re-
search has strongly increased in China over the past decade, universities
and research institutes have been receiving a steadily decreasing share
of this source of funding (Fig. 1).
The recent debate in Chinese policy making circles, which calls for
more attention to commercialization of basic research, is not very
strongly reﬂected in recent developments in research funding. Rather,
experimental development and applied research have always received
the bulk of national R & D expenditure, at about 94% in 2002–2004 to
about 95.5% of total expenditure in 2009–2011 (Fig. 2). As such, there
is relatively little room to further emphasize applied research, at the
cost of basic research funding.
3.2. Patenting and licensing of novel technologies
The engineering oriented research groups within our set of inter-
viewees all had a patent portfolio, of between circa ten to several dozen
patents, registered with the Chinese patenting oﬃce (SIPO). Note that
these were the numbers quoted at the research group level, not the
institute level. Interviewees mentioned a number of drivers for their
relatively high patenting activity.
First, they indicated that it would protect their inventions and,
when licensed or sold, had the potential to generate proﬁt for the in-
stitute as well as personal bonuses for the research groups’ personnel.
At all of the groups that we visited, ownership of the patents was held
by the institute, although the scientiﬁc staﬀ was mentioned as inventor
on the patents. Because of the institutes’ ownership, decisions on li-
censing and sales of patent rights were dependent on approval by the
institutes’ leadership. The suggested distribution of revenue was similar
across a number of institutes. Generally, the institute would receive
60% of proceeds. The remaining 40% would be distributed across the
research groups’ scientiﬁc personnel, as personal bonuses, with ap-
proximately half (20% of total revenue) going to the research group
leader.
Secondly, patent numbers were relatively high because the appli-
cation process is relatively easy and inexpensive. China has three ca-
tegories of patents; invention, utility model and design. Invention pa-
tents are the most thoroughly examined for novelty and generally take
around two to two and a half years to be granted; utility model patents
only take about half a year to be granted. It has to be noted that Chinese
IPR law has been amended in 2009. Amongst others, novelty demands
have been increased to novelty on a global level, whereas this used to
be novelty amongst patents ﬁle in China only [57]. It was not made
clear in our interviews whether researcher were speaking of past ex-
periences in ease of ﬁling patents and whether this amendment had
changed this much. Patent application cost, excluding fees for lawyers
that help ﬁle the application, were stated to be about 1.000–2.000 RMB
(about $150-300), although costs increase depending on the period of
protection applied for. These costs would be covered by project funding
or by the institute.
Thirdly, patent numbers are used in evaluation of projects, by
governmental ﬁnancing agencies, and in evaluation of personnel, for
instance in applications for professorship, by universities and institutes.
Fig. 1. Research contract value and recipients. Note:
total value (in billion RMB) is indicated on the right
hand axis. Data prior to 2006 did not specify corpo-
rate recipient into domestic versus foreign entities.
Contractors included governmental agencies, other
public organisations, and corporate organizations.
Source: [54,55]
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Multiple interviewees indicated that the criteria in evaluation
amounted to perverse incentives to patent. When asked about the dri-
vers for patenting, one of the more forward interviewee’s response was
as follows:
“Government requirement!” [and only when asked to elaborate:] “It is a
requirement included in the contract. When you get this funding, you
have to apply for [this number of] patents. Evaluation also includes
[whether] we built the equipment or the demonstration plant.”
Others commented similarly:
“Frankly speaking, I think that in some universities, maybe half of the
patents are just useless; it’s just for the promotion, but some are very
useful”.
And in another interview:
“When the project is ﬁnished, after 3 or 4 years, you should have several
patents. This is the rule [the project contract stipulated]. So I think half of
the patents is garbage’. After several years the owner of the patent will
give it up [i.e., cease to pay fees for upkeep], because they think the
patent is not useful”.
Not all comments were as critical, however. The majority of inter-
viewees indicated they did see patenting as a valuable instrument to
protect inventions. One interviewee further stressed that their patenting
strategy was more cautious than at most research groups; they rather
postponed applications to allow for further testing and experimenta-
tion, and ensure the patent would be worth the future upkeep fees.
Only limited success was reported in the licensing or sale of these
patents, however. Many of the research groups were involved in a
number of relatively large demonstration plant activities (more in
Section 3.3), utilizing proprietary technology developed by the research
groups. Outside of these activities, however, only two of the inter-
viewees indicated that technologies had made their way into the mar-
ketplace through repetitive licensing to an equipment manufacturer or
operators of energy or fuel production facilities.
For example, the Institute for Thermal Power Engineering at
Zhejiang University was the primary research group involved in China’s
ﬁrst domestically developed, commercial scale, biomass power gen-
eration technology. Their design for a 12 MW circulating ﬂuidized bed
(CFB), direct combustion biomass boiler, was ﬁrst used in the Suqian
power station, which started producing power in 2009 with two of the
12 MW boilers. This design was scaled up to 15, 18 and 20 MW ver-
sions, and later the same research group developed a second generation
of the boiler, with a 50 MW unit capacity. By 2015, the technology has
been employed in 32 power stations across China, operated by several
diﬀerent power companies. In the earliest projects, the research group
was strongly involved, providing technical support and helping oversee
the construction process. In recent years, the involvement has become
less. The technology is licensed to a boiler manufacturer, which is also
responsible for the advertisement and business development of the
technology.
At the Institute for Thermal Power Engineering at Zhejiang
University, researchers have a long-running research program for the
provision of modern biomass technologies in rural settings. In the early
2000s, they developed gasiﬁcation devices to produce gas for cooking,
utilizing crop wastes. The research group has designed and piloted
village level scale devices, for approximately 100–150 households, as
well as a device for a single household. The devices were taken in
production and marketed by an equipment manufacturer under a li-
censing agreement. Only few units were sold, however. The manu-
facturer found a niche market in on-site power generation at remote
locations, in Vietnam’s forestry industry. The technology did not be-
come successful in its target market as poor rural households were not
easily convinced to spend money on either a gasiﬁcation device or
cooking gas from a local gas network, when burning fuel wood or crop
wastes remained a less costly alternative.
These ﬁndings on patenting and licensing largely match with na-
tional statistics. China’s IP magazine reported several 10,000 s of pa-
tents ﬁled by Chinese research institutes and universities, but only
several 100 s being licensed to third parties (Table 2). This was true
even though the bulk of applications were of the ‘invention’ category,
which are more rigorously examined, and considered to be more va-
luable. Note that these numbers refer to all patents, not just those in the
bio-energy domain. Although government requirements have helped
push up patent ﬁling activity, industry interest has not grown accord-
ingly; some explanations for this are provided in Section 4.
3.3. Performing pilot and (commercial) demonstration RD &D activities
The step from ideas or models towards real world application of
technologies requires testing and demonstration of devices or installa-
tions at increasing levels of scale. Experiments are usually classiﬁed as
lab, pilot, demonstration or commercial scale.
All of the engineering departments interviewed had been applying
their technologies at some scale beyond laboratory experiments. An
overview is provided in Table 3. This table is not exhaustive: some
interviewees had been involved in up to around 10 larger scale projects;
projects included in this table are the ones that were chosen to be
discussed in detail during the interviews. Although there is no strict
guideline on what size of installation classiﬁes as a pilot or demon-
stration etc., the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has
suggested a classiﬁcation of production facilities of liquid fuels
(Table 4). The interviewees consistently referred to the installations in
Table 3 as either pilot or demonstration activities, whilst comparison
with IRENA classes indicates that the large majority of these installa-
tions could be considered to be of a more advanced development phase.
Fig. 2. National R & D expenditure. Note: total value (in billion RMB)
is indicated on the right hand axis.
Source: [56]
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More surprising than the fact that academics were involved in such
large scale production facilities, however, was the extent of their role in
such projects. Of course, the research groups contributed their tech-
nological knowledge, most often in the form of patented technology, by
providing equipment design, and usually also by trouble-shooting and
ﬁne-tuning operations. In quite a number of projects, however, their
involvement far exceeded this typical academic or engineering role.
For example, the 150 t/a demonstration plant for bio-jetfuel of the
Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion involved no corporate
partner, leaving the organization of construction and operation of the
plant entirely to the institute. The demo plant does not market its fuels,
but produces batches of fuel of up to circa ﬁve tonnes, for testing
purposes, including e.g., jet engine tests. Funds for running the plant,
Table 2
Patents and licensing at China’s research institutes and universities.
Source: [58].
Research Institutes
Applications ﬁled (2006–2010) Patents licensed
Invention Utility model Design Total No. (2012) as% of applications
Top 3 83 146 6 235 54 23.0%
Top 20 1394 578 32 2004 123 6.1%
All (69) 16,078 3409 117 19,604 211 1.1%
Universities
Applications ﬁled (2006–2010) Patents licensed
Invention Utility model Design Total No. (2012) as% of applications
Top 3 177 7 7 191 11 5.8%
Top 20 9953 1354 300 11,607 181 1.6%
All (116) 103,015 18,515 5715 127,245 635 0.5%
Notes: Data includes 69 research institutes with at least 50 applications between 2006 and 2012: the 116 universities are the top universities as identiﬁed in the government’s ‘211
project’. Ranking was based on licensing success, as a share of applications ﬁled.
Table 3
Pilot and demonstration activities of interviewed groups.
Group Technology Product Period Scale IRENA class
Institute for thermal power engineering, Zhejiang University Direct combustion with CFB Electricity 2007 12 MWel Comm.
12th FYP 50 MWel Comm.
Research Center for Biomass Energy, East China University of Science and
Technology
Dilute acid hydrolysis Cellulosic ethanol 10th FYP 600 t/a Demo
Biomass Energy Engineering Research Centre, Shanghai Jiao Tong
University
Pyrolysis Producer gas 11th FYP 30 househ. Pilot
State key laboratory of clean energy utilization, Zhejiang University Gasiﬁcation Producer gas 10th FYP 130 househ. Demo
College of chemical engineering and material science, Zhejiang University
of Technology
Transesteriﬁcation of UCO Biodiesel 11th FYP 30 kt/a Comm.
Transesteriﬁcation of UCO, Castor oil Biodiesel 12th FYP 150 kt/a Large comm.
Faculty of engineering, Zhejiang University Sludge incineration Heat and power 11th FYP 36.5 kt/a Comm.
Biomass Energy Research Centre, Guangzhou Institute of Energy
Conversion
Gasiﬁcation and gas engine Heat and power 10th FYP 1 MW Pre-comm.
11th FYP 5.5 MW Pre-comm.
Guangzhou Institute of Energy conversion, Chinese Academy of Sciences Gasiﬁcation DME 2009 100 t/a Demo
2010 1 kt/a Pre-comm.
Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion, Chinese Academy of Sciences
(coop with others)
Enzymatic or dilute acid hydrolysis Cellulosic ethanol 2015 4 kt/a Pre-comm.
Biomass Synthesis fuels and Chemicals Lab, Guangzhou Institute of Energy
Conversion
Gasiﬁcation Bio-jetfuel 2011 150 t/a Demo
12th FYP 1 kt/a Pre-comm.
Biogasoline 13th FYP 10 kt/a Pre- Comm.
Biomass Thermal-chemical Conversion Lab, Guangzhou Institute of
Energy Conversion
Fixed bed gasiﬁcation and gas engine Heat and power 10th FYP 5 MWel Pre-comm.
School of Environment, Tsinghua University Anaerobic digestion of bio-MSW Biogas 10th FYP 35 kt waste/a Comm.
Biomass Bio-chemical Conversion Lab, Guangzhou Institute of Energy
Conversion
Algae based biodiesel Biodiesel 2009 10 kt/a Pre-comm.
12th FYP 30 kt/a Comm.
National Key Lab of Biochemical Engineering, Chinese Academy of
Sciences
unclear Cellulosic ethanol 12th FYP 30 kt/a Comm.
unclear Butanol 2012 50 kt/a Comm.
Notes: Original IRENA classes are for liquid fuels only; classes for power and gas generation are estimates of the authors. Years are provided when it was clear what year production
started. Mostly, interviewees referred to periods when the project was planned, constructed or started operation, using reference to Five Year Plan periods. The 10th FYP ran from 2000 to
2005, the 11th FYP from 2006 to 2010 and the 12th FYP from 2011 to 2015.
Table 4
IRENA classiﬁcation of plant scales.






Large commercial 120–200 kt/a
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which is expensive, have so far come from government commissioned
research projects, and not from industry.
In the 4 kt/a cellulosic ethanol demo-plant where the Guangzhou
Institute for Energy Conversion was involved, there was an industrial
partner (a producer of sugar and (fermentation based) ethanol for al-
coholic beverages). The project was conceived by the institute and a
number of academic partners, however. The industry partner was
sought and asked to join only after project funding from the national
government had been secured. The project leader indicated that even
after project funding had been granted, corporate involvement was not
easily secured, and required them to negotiate with several ﬁrms before
one agreed to cooperate in the project. The industry partner provided
the location for the demo plant (on its premises), the fermentation
equipment, as well as the feedstock (sugar cane bagasse) free of charge.
Contracting an equipment manufacturer capable of providing the pre-
treatment equipment, supervision of construction and installation, as
well as practical issues such as building and environmental permit
applications were the responsibility of the research institutes, however.
Such deep involvement of research groups in demonstration scale
projects appeared to be more common in projects that were co-ﬁnanced
by private investors. One problem was that, unlike in the cellulosic
ethanol project described above, these investors typically came from
entirely unrelated industries. These investors sought to assume the role
typical of a venture capitalist, and not that of e.g., a joint venture
partner, leaving much more of the organizational aspects to the re-
search groups. As one interviewee commented:
“They have only money; they are an investor. [.] Sometimes I think I
work like an organizer of everything. [.] So we should ﬁnd the manu-
facturer for diﬀerent machines by ourselves. And for construction, even; I
have to [supervise] their schedule [so that] when the equipment arrives,
we have somewhere to put it.”
This comment was echoed by another research group leader, which
similarly stated they were responsible for coordination of construction,
permit procedures, run-in of the plant, and training of the operators.
Despite the fact that many of the production facilities in Table 3
were at or close to commercial scale, very few have been replicated
throughout the rest of China by the industry partners in the projects.
Exceptions are the two technologies produced under license, dealt with
in Section 3.2. A further example of replication is the gasiﬁers from the
Biomass Energy Research Centre in Guangzhou, which were marketed
through a company created by the institute itself (see Section 3.4, on
ﬁrm creation). The limited replication of projects may, in part, be due
to timing; many of these plants have been constructed relatively re-
cently. Other explanations of limited industry involvement and interest
in replication are dealt with in Section 4.
3.4. Establishing new ﬁrms and production facilities
As for production facilities, there is arguably some overlap with the
near-commercial and commercial scale production facilities of fuels and
power introduced in Table 3 in the previous section. Apart from these,
two clear examples of ﬁrms created by research groups came up during
our interviews.
First, the Biomass Energy Research Centre of the Guangzhou
Institute of Energy Conversion developed a biomass gasiﬁer that can be
coupled to a gas engine for the supply of power and heat. The institute
established a joint venture together with an industry partner to develop
or operate small scale power plants. Throughout the 10th and 11th FYP
periods (1996–2005), this company developed approximately 20 pro-
jects of around 1 MWel each, and one project of 5 MWel. The projects
were located mostly in China, but also in a number of South-East Asian
countries. Although the technology performed well, the renewable en-
ergy law and subsequent feed-in-tariﬀs promulgated in China from
2005 onwards, favoured larger scale (30–50 MW) power plants (see
also [16]). At these scales, direct combustion technologies are more
ﬁnancially competitive, leaving little market opportunities for these
gasiﬁer units. The Joint Venture partner agreed to buy out the research
group, and hasn’t managed to expand operations since.
Secondly, researchers at the Biomass Synthesis fuels and Chemicals
Lab, Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion are currently nego-
tiating plans with a private investor for the construction of a com-
mercial demonstration plant for the production of bio-gasoline, with a
capacity of circa 10 kt/a. Although many details were yet to be worked
out, the head of the research group leader expected that they would
eventually form a joint venture. He further indicated that this would be
at the investors’ request. As the technology had not been used at this
scale before, the investor would want to ensure a strong commitment
from the institute to ensure smooth run-in and operation of the plant,
and considered that a direct ﬁnancial stake in the project would be the
best incentive to ensure such commitment.
4. Limits to academic entrepreneurship in driving development of
China’s advanced bio-energy technology sector
Section 3 revealed that within the Chinese academic community
working on advanced bio-energy technologies, there are plenty of ex-
amples very entrepreneurially minded research groups. These activities
have so far not resulted in wide-spread diﬀusion of these advanced bio-
energy technologies in China, however. Below we describe ﬁve reasons
why these technologies have seen limited commercialization, despite
strong academic entrepreneurship.
4.1. Industry demands highly mature technologies
First, industry appeared to have very high expectations on the ma-
turity of technologies produced by academic organizations, and has
been reluctant to be strongly involved in technological development
processes.
For example, the development of the commercially successful CFB
biomass boiler by the institute of thermal power engineering at
Zhejiang University, had very little industry involvement. Even after
successful demonstration of their 12 MW boilers, the development of
the second generation, 50 MW, boilers had depended entirely on ﬁ-
nancing from government research funding, and some investment from
the institute itself.
The researcher that coordinated the 4kt/a cellulosic ethanol de-
monstration by the Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion (see also
Section 3.3) stated that they were not concerned that equipment
manufacturers, contracted to manufacture the pre-treatment reactor,
would pirate or sell on the technology. She argued that, as the tech-
nology was only in the demonstration phase, the technology, and the
patent, did not have much commercial value just yet. Firms would only
be interested in licensing or buying the technology if and when it would
be ﬁnancially competitive. Nearly all our interviewees echoed this ar-
gument as a reason why industry interest for their technologies had
been lacking.
Novel technologies, however, seldom come out of the laboratory
ready for wide-spread market roll out. There is a role for entrepreneurs
to select promising technologies and develop these towards marketable
solutions, either unilaterally or in co-operation with academic partners.
The Chinese energy industry, then, appears to have a somewhat short-
term view on proﬁtability, and their reluctance to participate in the
further development of these technologies suggests a limited en-
trepreneurial spirit in industry rather than academia. The fact that a
small number of private investors with limited or no background in
petrochemical or power sectors are venturing into this strongly gov-
ernment controlled industry further indicates that the state owned en-
ergy companies in particular are unwilling or reluctant to invest in
these advanced biomass technologies, which still have a somewhat
longer timeframe to proﬁtability.
This passive stance towards this sector of these SOE is somewhat
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surprising, as the Chinese government has managed to ensure strong
participation of SOE in the development of other renewable energy
sectors. These have, for example, been actively involved in the devel-
opment of a domestic wind turbine manufacturing sector [60–62]. A
number of SOE have further been active in ﬁrst generation (i.e., grain
based) fuel ethanol production [17] (see also Section 4.5). There are a
number of reasons that diﬀerentiate advanced biomass energy tech-
nologies from these other examples, some of which reﬂect more limited
government guidance. These include (1) more limited market creation
policy (more in Section 4.3); (2) a preference of developers for larger
scale projects, which are more diﬃcult when crop residues need to be
sourced within a relatively small area around a project [16]; (3) diﬃ-
culties in sourcing a secure supply of biomass residues at relatively
stable prices (more in Section 4.4); (4) more limited potential for the
import and transfer of matured foreign technology (more in Section
4.5); (5) political hesitation for strong support over concerns for land
and water shortages in case of increased crop cultivation for energy
purposes [17,18]; and (6) the fact that biomass energy policy is the
domain of MOA rather than the NDRC, which issues policy for other
(renewable) energy sectors and has far greater political power [63,64].
Industrial development and catching-up policies for the wind power
sector have been far more elaborate and coherent for the wind power
than for the biomass energy sector [62].
4.2. Industry demands very large scale demonstration of technologies
Related to the previous point; the potential industry partners for
advanced bio-energy technologies demand a very large scale of de-
monstration performed by research organizations, before they join de-
velopment eﬀorts. This is most clear from the comparison of demon-
stration plant sizes with IRENA classiﬁcations plant sizes. One of our
interviewees had work experience in Germany and Canada, and in-
dicated that research groups in China tended to be involved in larger
scale plants, or “have to go further along the innovation chain” than his
previous colleagues would have. He argued that industry in those
countries would have approached research institutes for more funda-
mental research questions, whereas the Chinese industry would only
start to get interested when processes had been proven at scale. He also
argued that the Chinese government too, more strongly encouraged the
involvement of academic personnel in larger scale facilities with its
research funding. This was not necessarily a complaint, as he agreed it
was the role of engineers to put technologies into practice. Others did
complain. The following quote from one researcher was representative
of comments by a number of others:
“We don’t have the ability, the power, to make these things. We can
resolve some technological problems, but we cannot make these products
for commercialization to be used, not [at] this large scale.”
The lack of industry involvement is not only a problem because
research groups or their research grants have limited ﬁnancial capacity.
Actors from industry are likely better placed to deal with such issues as
the construction and operation of a larger scale plant, sourcing the
required feedstock and marketing their product, dealing with reg-
ulatory issues and lobbying for necessary or more beneﬁcial policy for
advanced bio-energy markets, etc. The existence of a number of large
scale demonstration plants, largely organized by academic organiza-
tions, indicates that these have been able to make up for the lack of
industry involvement to some extent. Further scale-up or wide-spread
replication of such plants, however, seems unlikely without substantial
industry involvement.
4.3. Market creation policies are deﬁcient
Interviewees working on liquid biofuels in particular argued there
were deﬁciencies in policy for market creation. For fuel ethanol, there
has been a mandatory use of 10% ethanol blends in a number of
provinces and cities, a subsidy for every ton of fuel produced, as well as
a guaranteed minimum level of proﬁt for each producer of fuel (for
more details see also [17]). Market entry into fuel ethanol production is
strongly restricted, however. Approval for such production has so far
been awarded to state owned enterprises (SOE) only. These are not
necessarily energy sector SOEs; COFCO, the countries’ largest grain
processor, is involved in a number of ethanol plants. In the 4kt/a cel-
lulosic ethanol demonstration by the Guangzhou Institute of Energy
Conversion (see Section 3.3), a state owned sugar factory is involved.
Restrictions were motivated over a concern of competition between
food and fuel uses with ﬁrst generation fuel ethanol. One of our inter-
viewees claimed that second generation ethanol production remained
restricted over fuel quality concerns, whereas another indicated gov-
ernment may fear mislabelling of ﬁrst generation fuels as cellulosic
ethanol in a less controlled sector. The current high levels of oversight
on ﬂows of feedstocks, for example, has enabled government to issue
quota on the use of sugar, of which there is a current surplus in Chinese
markets, for ethanol production. There are no restrictions to market
entry for biodiesel, but also no support policies in terms of mandated
use or subsidies. As a consequence, the biodiesel market is far smaller
[17].
Researchers working on bio-gasoline projects saw great obstacles in
marketing their fuel. There is no fuel standard, no production subsidy,
and fuel retailers cannot use bio-gasoline blending to fulﬁl ethanol
blending obligations. In discussions on possible future policy, govern-
ment oﬃcials argued the sector needed to achieve some scale before
such instruments would be implemented, essentially causing a stale-
mate as researchers argued there would be no further scaling without
suﬃcient market creation policy. One interviewee also argued this had
been less of a problem in early ethanol fuel production as large scale
ethanol production capacity already existed for diﬀerent products and
could readily be repurposed for fuel production.
4.4. Energy and biomass feedstock prices are very volatile
Fossil fuel prices, in particular those of oil, but those of coal and
natural gas as well, have been very volatile over the past decade. It is
therefore diﬃcult for investors to forecast at what levels of production
costs of biomass-based transport fuels or power generation, these will
be able to compete with fossil alternatives. There is further uncertainty
and risks from strong rises in biomass feedstock prices witnessed in
areas surrounding biomass energy projects [cf. 16,18]. One interviewee
stated that they sought to establish cooperation for demo and com-
mercial plants only with companies with control over feedstock, such as
rice or sugar cane mills. Outside of such niches, however, the volatility
of energy and biomass feedstock prices can be expected to lead to re-
duced investor interest in the advanced bio-energy technologies pro-
vided by research organizations.
4.5. Competition with foreign technology suppliers
The quality of energy conversion technologies, including in such
aspects as eﬃciency, maintenance needs, and in some cases energy
consumption, aﬀects proﬁtability and therefore investor interest. It is
very diﬃcult, and well beyond the scope of this paper, to compare the
quality of domestic versus foreign biomass energy technologies. Many
of our interviewees did indicate that competition with foreign tech-
nology providers made it more diﬃcult for them to market their pro-
ducts, however. This is visible in a number of market segments. China’s
ﬁrst large scale cellulosic ethanol plant, for instance, was a cooperation
between COFCO and Novozymes, a global market leader in enzymes for
biofuel production [17]. In biomass power generation, the market was
dominated by a joint venture (DP Cleantech) between a Danish tech-
nology provider and a Chinese developer and operator, in the years
immediately following the creation of a feed-in-tariﬀ for biomass power
in China [16]. Technological quality and track record are likely to have
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played a role in the choice for foreign over domestic technology, but
two interviewees also stated that Chinese project developers, especially
in ﬁrst tier cities, were inclined to use foreign technology as it would
give a more modern or advanced appearance to their projects.
Foreign technology has also played a key role in the development of
the Chinese wind and PV sectors [62]. The dominant technology
transfer mechanism in the early phases of the Chinese wind turbine
manufacturing sector was licensing of foreign turbine designs, followed
by mergers & acquisitions, cooperative development and independent
development as technological capacities in the sector grew. Similarly,
domestic manufacturing started out with less complex components such
as towers and foundations, later followed by generators, gearboxes,
blades, inverters and control systems, as domestic technological capa-
cities progressed [60,65,66]. A prominent domestic research institute,
the Institute of Wind Energy at the Shenyang University of Technology
(SUT), managed to commercialize its technology through the creation
of a spin-oﬀ company (China Creative). It has had more diﬃculties li-
censing its designs, ﬁnding demand mostly from lower tier manu-
factures with very little turbine sales [61].
Arguably, there is less potential for technology transfer in advanced
biomass energy technologies, as the availability of foreign technology
that is ready for roll-out is limited. Most second generation biofuel
projects, globally, are still in the pilot and demonstration phase
[67,68]. For example, these technologies make up 13 out of 39 projects
funded through the EU’s NER 300 program (running from 2014 to
2020), an innovation fund for demonstration of novel renewable energy
technologies [69].
5. Conclusion and policy implications
Developments in China’s advanced bio-energy sector are slow, and
are behind on policy targets even though these were only of limited
ambition levels. A lack of academic entrepreneurship, often identiﬁed
as a barrier in early commercialization stages of novel technologies,
does not appear to be a root cause here, however. Academia in this
sector appear very entrepreneurial: they consider the future commercial
potential of diﬀerent technological pathways when deciding on re-
search priorities, they patent and attempt to license their technologies,
they are highly involved in very large scale demonstration plants and
have in some cases managed to create new ﬁrms or production facil-
ities.
A bigger barrier to further development of the nascent sector ap-
pears to be the unrealistic expectations from both industry and gov-
ernment on the level of maturity and scale of technologies that come
out of the academic research system. Industry seems reluctant to invest
before the technologies have been demonstrated at (even) larger scale,
have suﬃcient track record, and have clear market opportunities,
whilst government seems reluctant to develop market creation policies
until the technologies have better ﬁnancial performance. This has cre-
ated somewhat of a stalemate. Seen the current status of many of the
technologies analysed here, academics have exhausted much of their
potential to contribute to maturation of these technologies unilaterally
(in terms of scale and ﬁnancial performance), and further maturation
will depend on stronger industry involvement, and market creation by
policy.
Breaking this stalemate requires policy makers to create better
market access and a clearer market value for these technological
pathways, in a bid to attract investor interest. This could be in the form
of subsidies that apply to every litre of biofuel, rather than being lim-
ited to fuel from the small number of ﬁrst generation ethanol plants
operated by SOE. This does not necessarily have to be a level of subsidy
where production of such fuels is proﬁtable at current performance
levels. Any level is better than none, as it at least creates a price point
for academia and industry to work towards with further technological
development. It is, in fact, somewhat surprising that this has not oc-
curred, as China has had good experiences with supporting renewable
power generation with feed-in-tariﬀs [62]. Transport fuels are also
subject to strong pricing regulation. Recently, China even introduced
minimum retail prices for (fossil) gasoline and diesel, in a bid to protect
oil companies from some of the ﬂuctuations in international crude oil
prices [70]. A number of bio-fuels lack market value altogether: even
the price level of fossil fuel alternatives is irrelevant as a number of bio-
fuels cannot be produced by certain actors and/or be marketed at all.
Market access and value could also be created by allowing blending
mandates to be fulﬁlled with any bio-fuel, rather than limiting it to
ethanol fuels only. This would allow fuel distributors to compare bio-
fuel prices and seek the most economical way to fulﬁl their mandates,
whilst simultaneously creating a development perspective for a wide
variety of biofuels.
Limiting fuel distribution and ethanol fuel production to large state
owned enterprises limits the diversity of actors involved in the in-
novation system for biofuels. This reduces competition and the pressure
to innovate, in particular as our interviews revealed that a number of
private enterprises were interested in experimenting with biofuel pro-
duction and sales. China’s policy makers do have more inﬂuence over
the corporate strategy of SOE than over that of private enterprises,
however, and this inﬂuence, too, could be used to steer more invest-
ment towards developing a wider range of bio-fuels. Again, encoura-
ging such investment behaviour would be easier if these fuels also had a
clearer market value.
It is further advisable to reconsider the focus on patent numbers in
evaluation criteria from academic institutions and government research
funds. Stimulus or obligation to produce patents has inﬂated patent
applications, and created signiﬁcant side-eﬀects. Academia are
spending time and eﬀort producing patents of little worth for the sake
of meeting evaluation demands, patenting bureaus are spending re-
sources processing these applications, and government funds are used
to create inﬂated statistics rather than useful research results.
Results presented here provide some contrast with existing litera-
ture on academic entrepreneurialism and the ‘third mission’ of uni-
versities. First, in contrast with a common critique in the literature on
academic entrepreneurialism, our results highlight that academic per-
sonnel can have both entrepreneurial mind sets and skills. Second, our
results highlight that limited commercialization of novel technologies is
not always due to lacking academic entrepreneurialism. As pointed out
by the ‘Technological Innovation Systems’ framework (section 2), such
commercialization requires active participation by a wide variety of
actors. Much previous work has focused on (quantitative) analyses of
output from academic organizations in terms of e.g., patents, licensing
agreements, start-ups, industry collaboration, etc., and how such output
could be improved through e.g., policies that mitigate legal or organi-
zational barriers to commercialization at academic organizations
[e.g.,50,51,52]. Our case study highlights that many types of outputs
depend just as much on industry demand and demand creation through
policy. It is therefore too simplistic to immediately equate a lack of such
output with lacking academic entrepreneurialism.
Lastly, it is important to point out that the strong domination of
State-Owned Enterprises and the very high level of government reg-
ulation of the (biomass) energy sector in China present a fairly unique
environment for the commercialization of novel technologies. These
characteristics do not preclude successful sector development, as evi-
denced by other renewable energy sectors in China, but neither do they
necessarily provide strong stimulus for the use of technology developed
by domestic academia [62].
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Appendix A. List of interviewees
# Aﬃliation Research area
Academics in engineering ﬁelds
1 Institute for Thermal Power Engineering – Zhejiang University Direct combustion (CFB boilers)
2 Department of Chemical Engineering for Energy Resources – East China University of Science and
Technology
Bioethanol
3 Research Center for Biomass Energy – East China University of Science and Technology Bioethanol
4 State key laboratory of clean energy utilization – Zhejiang University Biomass gasiﬁcation
5 Zhejiang province key laboratory of bio-fuel technology – Zhejiang University of Technology Biodiesel
6 Zhejiang Province Key Laboratory of bio-fuel technology – Zhejiang University of Technology Biodiesel
7 Zhejiang Province Key Laboratory of bio-fuel technology – Zhejiang University of Technology Biodiesel
8 Institute for Thermal Power Engineering – Zhejiang University Sewage sludge incineration
9 Bio-chemical Conversion Lab – Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Bioethanol
10 Biomass Energy Research Centre – Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Combustion and gasiﬁcation
11 Biomass Energy Research Centre – Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Bioethanol
12 Biomass Energy Research Centre – Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Bio-DME, jet fuels, biogasoline
13 Biomass Thermal-chemical Conversion Lab – Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Fixed bed gasiﬁcation
14 Department of Environmental Science & Engineering – Tsinghua University Sludge incineration and anaerobic
digestion
15 Key Laboratory of Renewable Energy – Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Biodiesel
16 Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Algae oil
17 National key lab of Biochemical Engineering – Institute of Process Engineering – CAS Cellulosic ethanol
18 Department of Microbiology and Immunology – China Agricultural University Cellulosic ethanol
19 College of Agronomy and Biotechnology – China Agricultural University Cellulosic ethanol
20 Biomass Engineering Center – China Agricultural University Biogas, policy/strategic research
21 Biomass Energy Engineering Research Centre – Shanghai Jiaotong University Biogas, ethanol, pyrolysis and biodiesel
Academics in non-engineering ﬁelds, policy and industry experts
22 School of Environment – Tsinghua University Policy (university)
23 Energy Strategy Research Center, Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Policy (research institute)
24 Energy Strategy Research Center, Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion – CAS Policy (research institute)
25 CREIA – Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association Policy (industry association)
26 CREIA – Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association Policy (industry association)
27 Center for Renewable Energy Development, Energy Research Institute, NDRC Policy (governmental research
institute)
28 Center for Renewable Energy Development, Energy Research Institute, NDRC Policy (governmental research
institute)
29 Local rural energy oﬃce, Hangzhou Biogas
30 Local rural energy oﬃce, Hangzhou Biogas
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